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Abstrat. A ommon feature pratial reputation shemes is that they
are on-line whih results in restritions to both availability and sala-
bility. In order to overome these two problems we propose an o-line
reputation sheme based on publi key ertiates. We introdue the
idea of artiulated ertiates whih use proxy signatures to inrease the
eÆieny of reputation veriation. As well as being well-suited to our
problem suh linked ertiates may be of independent interest.
1 Introdution
Reputation shemes are systems developed to ollet, analyse and propagate
users' reputation [12℄. They an be used for many purposes, but in the last few
years have emerged as a promising means for enabling eletroni transations
in e-ommere. Studies have shown that use of reputation shemes has positive
eets on the eÆieny and honesty of markets [1℄, and that the reputation of a
partiular agent an have positive eets on the agent's gain [13℄.
Most urrent reputation shemes, espeially the pratial ones, are speif-
ially designed for on-line use, eBay being a prime example (www.ebay.om).
This situation is not surprising as a reputation sheme must provide real time
responses so that users' past behaviours an be obtained immediately. Although
an on-line reputation sheme is urrently preferred, it suers two main diÆul-
ties: availability and salability. For example, in a ase of denial of servie it
may not be possible to aess the entral server and so reputation values annot
be found. If the entral server is distributed to overome suh problems, then
synhronisation and onsisteny of data will beome diÆult.
These problems of distributed reputation systems have muh in ommon
with the problems of distribution of publi keys. In both ases there is a need for
aess to authentiated values distributed in a timely fashion. Publi keys are
usually propagated through ertiates formed by an o-line trusted third party.
It seems a natural idea to use reputation ertiates formed in an analogous way
by a trusted third party. One of the main aims of this paper is to explore how
this may best be ahieved.
Reputation ertiates may be ontrolled by users themselves. The ertied
reputation value alulated from proessed feedbak is ommuniated to the rep-
utation owner after ompletion of transations with its ounterparts. Reputation
Table 1. The partiipants and their symbols
FT A feedbak target is the entity who is being evaluated and gains the reputation
rating based on the feedbak given by a feedbak provider.
RP A relying party is the entity who relies on the feedbak target's reputation
rating to make a deision whether to proeed in a transation or not.
CA The ertiate authority is responsible for the registration of the feedbak tar-
gets as well as to issue ertiates to them.
CC=RA The olletion entre/reputation authority ollets legitimate feedbaks and
uses them to alulate reputation rating and update the feedbak target's rep-
utation ertiate.
AA The attribute authority is responsible for issuing and signing the attributes.
ertiates an be obtained from reputation owners without the need to ontat
a entral authority. There seem to be two natural ways to realize this proposal.
1. Employ existing identity ertiate tehnologies, for example, X.509 [5℄ and
PGP [15℄ to inorporate reputation values.
2. Employ a separate ertiate speially for the reputation value.
In the former option a reputation rating is regarded as one of the attributes
in the identity ertiate. As a result the implementation does not require any
signiant modiation to the existing infrastruture. The latter, on the other
hand, requires a speial authority to manage the reputation rating sheme. We
will ompare the relative advantages of these dierent options later.
This paper proposes an o-line reputation sheme based on publi key erti-
ates. The solution is exible enough to aommodate most formats of reputation
rating. Dierent options are onsidered for how to bind the reputation informa-
tion with the identity of the subjet. Our proposal, whih we all artiulated
ertiates, an be applied in other situations when it is desired to augment or
update ertiate information without re-issuing the identity ertiate.
Organisation of the paper Setion 2 disusses the bakground of reputation
shemes. Setion 3 disusses three basi solutions to implement binding between
identity ertiates and reputation information. Setion 4 desribes our proposed
solution, its properties and the required protools. Setion 5 disusses the relative
merits with other options. Table 1 presents the notations and the symbols used
throughout the paper.
2 Reputation Systems
There has been onsiderable interest in reputation systems in reent years and
an extensive literature has developed [12℄. Reputation systems may be roughly
lassied into two ativities.
Reputation alulation is the task of obtaining reputation values from a set
of feedbak information. There are various properties that may be desirable
for alulation engines and reputation values may take dierent formats. In
this paper we are not onerned with how reputation values are alulated,
as long as they an be represented eÆiently in a bit string.
Reputation propagation is onerned with how to distribute reputation val-
ues to parties that require to use them. This is the area addressed in this
paper. There are dierent properties that may be important, inluding high
availability of values and reliability. A feature that has often been negleted
is privay of reputation values; we address this partially in this paper by
allowing owners of reputation ertiates to ontrol their distribution.
O-line reputation propagation has been proposed by some reent authors
[4, 3℄. These shemes addressed the integrity of the submitted feedbaks against
manipulation but are not suited to entralised reputation alulation. A reent
proposal of Liau et al. [7℄ (the LZBT sheme) demonstrated the possibility of
using ertiates to represent a user's reputation in the o-line environment. The
LZBT sheme seems promising for P2P systems beause no entral authority is
required to operate the sheme. However, its major limitation is that the relying
party has to ontat one or more of the preeding feedbak provider to verify
the validity of reputation ertiates. This reates an extra burden to the servie
onsumers to verify the ertiate.
3 Reputation ertiates
Identity ertiates bind the identities of users with their publi keys. The er-
tiate is issued and signed by a trusted ertiate authority CA. Identity erti-
ates are typially long term and ontain several attributes suh as subjet name,
publi key, expiry date, issuer name, and ertiate holder's name. These erti-
ates are mainly used for authentiation purposes. Attribute ertiates [9℄, on
the other hand, are mainly used to provide aess ontrols and role permissions
of an entity with regard to aessing resoures. Therefore, these ertiates are
often employed within organizational boundaries. Attribute ertiates typially
do not ontain the identity of an entity; instead they may ontain attributes suh
as role, aess ontrol, expiry date, the issuer name and the issuer signature.
A reputation rating an be onsidered as an attribute bound to an iden-
tity. Reputation ertiates therefore need to be used in onjuntion with an
identity ertiate. There are various ways that this may be ahieved. Park
and Sandhu [11℄ disussed three tehniques to bind two ertiates (the iden-
tity and the attribute ertiate): monolithi, autonomi and hained signatures.
In the monolithi signature tehnique the identity and attribute ertiate are
ombined to beome a single ertiate whih is signed by an authority. The
autonomi signature tehnique implements separate signatures: the identity er-
tiate and the attribute ertiate are signed by dierent authorities. To bind
the two ertiates ertain attributes in the identity ertiate are linked to the
attribute ertiate. Finally in the hained signature tehnique the signature of
authority on the identity ertiate is used as a onnetion link between the
identity and the attribute ertiates. In the next subsetions we will onsider
solutions whih orrespond roughly to this lassiation.
3.1 Combined Certiates
In this solution the identity ertiate and reputation ertiate are the same
objet, and the reputation value is simply an additional attribute in the er-
tiate. This orresponds to the monolithi ertiate of Park and Sandhu [11℄.
Figure 1 depits the abstrat view of the solution. In this solution, the feedbak
target and the feedbak provider are required to register with the authority. A
reputation ertiate is issued and signed by the reputation ertiate authority.
The reputation ertiate should be veried by the relying party.
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Fig. 1. Abstrat view of Combined Reputation Certiate
The ombined ertiate oers several advantages; it requires no new infras-
truture, is straightforward to implement and requires only one operation to
verify the authority's signature. However, it has some drawbaks.
1. The reputation authority is required to issue and manage the ertiates
besides its routine task to alulate the reputation of the partiipants.
2. The reputation attribute beomes available to any party who has aess
to the identity ertiate. Users may prefer to hold their reputation values
privately exept when needed for transations.
3. Reputation ertiates need to be updated frequently so the identity erti-
ate also needs to be issued eah time the reputation is updated.
A dierent way to form a ombined ertiate was the smart ertiate pro-
posed by Park and Sandhu [10℄. The sheme uses the struture of the X.509
ertiate as its basis and the extension elds in the original ertiate are used
to inorporate additional attributes. Eah attribute in the ertiate is managed
by dierent authorities. Although the smart ertiate has several desirable prop-
erties, a major limitation highlighted by Chadwik and Otenko [2℄ is that it is
automatially invalid one any attribute is hanged. We expet the reputation
rating to hange frequently and the ertiate needs to be re-issued eah time.
3.2 Separate Certiates
The separate ertiate orresponds to the autonomi ertiate of Park and
Sandhu [11℄. Figure 2 is a graphial representation of the solution showing the
two types of ertiates used. The identity ertiate is issued by the ertiate
authority, while the reputation ertiate will be issued by the reputation au-
thority. The ertiates are linked due to shared information, in partiular the
unique name (or X.509 distinguished name) from the identity ertiate may be
inluded in the attribute ertiate.
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Fig. 2. Abstrat view of Separate Certiate
Beause there are two authorities, separation of duties an be onduted
whih an redue the problem of overloading the reputation authority. The rep-
utation authority is only responsible for the alulation of the reputation, while
the ertiate authority is responsible for the registration of the feedbak targets.
The identity ertiate is used as an identity mehanism for the feedbak target.
Like the ombined ertiate solution, this solution also has its limitations.
1. It is ostly to math the identity ertiate and the reputation ertiate
espeially to the relying party RP who has to do three steps of veria-
tion: rst to hek the validity of the identity ertiate; seond to hek
the validity of the reputation ertiate; third to math between these two
ertiates.
2. RP annot determine whether RA is authorized to provide reputation for
FT s. This means that relying parties have to independently hek the poliy
and pratie statements for any issuers of attribute ertiates.
3.3 Related Certiates
The idea of related ertiates is to ensure that the attribute ertiate has a
funtional link to the identity ertiate, beyond simply referring to the same
identity. This orresponds to the hained ertiates of Park and Sandhu [11℄.
The dierene from the separate ertiate option is that now the binding infor-
mation in the attribute ertiate depends on the CA signature on the identity
ertiate. In other words, the attribute ertiate is bound to a spei instane
of the identity ertiate.
Using an attribute ertiate related to the identity ertiate as the reputa-
tion ertiate is a reasonable option. However, the drawbaks already mentioned
for separate ertiates still apply. Independent signature heking inreases the
omputational burden. The issue of authorization of the RA also applies here,
but with a dierent twist. The issuer of attribute ertiate is free to at inde-
pendently of the CAof the identity ertiate. However, CAs may objet to use
of their ertiates by third parties for purposes without their onsent and may
put in plae legal obstales to prevent this.
4 Artiulated Certiates
From the disussion in setion 3 we see that eah of the previous proposals
for binding identity and attribute ertiates has some drawbaks when used
for reputation ertiates, although separate ertiates or related ertiates
ould be reasonable hoies. In this setion we proposed a new sheme for linking
reputation and identity ertiates. We alled this an artiulated ertiate.
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ate
Figure 3 illustrates the view of the proposed sheme. The properties of ar-
tiulated ertiates are dierent from all the options onsidered in setion 3.
{ Artiulated ertiates an only be issued by entities that have been autho-
rised to do so by the identity CA. Moreover, the authority to issue may be
restrited for a spei purpose or partiular time interval.
{ The artiulated ertiate an be veried using the CApubli key alone {
no separate ertiate is required for the reputation authority.
{ The identity ertiate may be used either with or without the attribute
ertiate.
A major feature of our proposed solution is to use the onept of delegation
to allow the ertiation authority to give power to the reputation authority
to link to the original ertiate. Delegation enables RA to update reputation
rating in the ertiate without invalidating the ertiate. The CA delegates
his signing apability to RA using the proxy signature sheme. Figure 4 shows
the abstrat view of the proposed arhiteture.
FT
CA
RA
RP
D
elegate
Signature
Issue Certificate
Show
Certificate
Upda
te Ce
rtifica
te
Fig. 4. Proposed Ar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ture
4.1 Proxy Signatures
Proxy signature shemes allow an original signer to delegate signing apability to
another entity, the proxy signer. The rst proxy signature sheme was introdued
by Mambo et al. [8℄. Subsequently a number of shemes have been proposed in
the literature [14, 6℄. For our purpose the sheme of Mambo et al. (MUO sheme
hereafter) will be employed. However, other proxy signature shemes an also be
used in our proposal. A brief review of MUO sheme follows.
System Settings: Global system parameters onsist of a large prime p, a
prime fator q of p   1, and an element g 2 Z

p
of order q. Computations take
plae in Z

p
unless indiated otherwise. Entity A denotes the original signer and
B denotes the proxy signer. Assume that x
A
is a private key for A and the
orresponding publi key y
A
= g
x
A
and m
w
is a statement about delegation
whih typially ontains some partiulars inluding the proxy signer identia-
tion. A one way hash funtion H() is used. The sheme an be divided into four
phases; generation of a proxy key, veriation of the proxy key, signing using the
proxy key and verifying the proxy signature. A small modiation is made to
the original of MUO sheme to inlude the hash of m
w
.
Generation of a proxy key. A hooses a random number, k 2
R
Z

q
and om-
putes r = g
k
. He proeeds to ompute s
P
= x
A
H(m
w
) + kr mod q and then
sends (s
P
; r) to B seurely.
Veriation of the proxy key. Upon reeiving (s
P
; r), B veries g
s
P
?
= y
H(m
w
)
A
r
r
.
If this equation holds B aepts it is a valid proxy key.
Signing using the proxy key. B signs message m using the proxy key s
P
.
The signed message is S(m); r where S() is any disrete log signature gen-
eration algorithm.
Verifying of the proxy signature. A verier rst alulates y
P
= y
H(m
w
)
A
r
r
and heks the validity of the proxy signature V (y
P
;message)
?
= true where
V () is a the signature veriation algorithm.
Sine MUO sheme is employed, the properties of the sheme of MUO are
automatially inherited into our proposal.
1. Unforgeablity Besides CA, only RA an reate a valid proxy signature.
The third parties who are not designated as a proxy signer annot reate a
valid proxy key.
2. Veriability RP an be onvined of the original signer agreement on the
signed message.
3. Identiability Anyone an determine the identity of the proxy signer from
a proxy signature.
4. Undeniability One the proxy signer reates a valid proxy signature he
annot repudiate it.
4.2 Protool of the Sheme
The protool onsists of six phases as follows. Exeution of the phases is not
neessarily in sequential order, exept that the delegation and registration phases
have to be exeuted prior to the other phases. Some phases may need to be
exeuted more than one, suh as updating ertiate, showing ertiate and
validating ertiate.
{ Delegation CA delegates signing apability to RA so that RA an update
the ertiate of FT with a new reputation rating. It is assumed that both
parties CA and RA have already agreed upon the terms and onditions of
delegation beforehand whih are enoded in m
w
. To delegate, CA exeutes
the generation phase of the MUO sheme by hoosing a random number k
and omputes r
RA
= g
k
. This is followed by omputing s
RA
= x
CA
H(m
w
)+
kr
RA
mod q and sends (s
RA
; r
RA
) to RA seurely. On reeiving this pair RA
veries g
s
RA
?
= y
CA
H(m
w
)r
r
RA
RA
. If this holds RA aepts it is a valid proxy
key.
{ Registration FT reates a publi key y
FT
and the orresponding private
key x
FT
. y
FT
and ID
FT
are seurely sent to CA for registration. A typial
ertiate format of the basi ertiate may be as follows:
Sig
CA
FT y
FT
Exp CA RA
where Sig
CA
denotes the CA's signature and Exp denotes expiry date of
the ertiate, On reeiving FT 's partiulars, CA veries their validity. The
ertiate is signed by CA using his private key x
CA
and is sent to FT .
Notie that it is not essential to inlude the identity of the reputation au-
thorities with the identity ertiate, as shown above. Instead, the RA may
be identied separately to the relying party by the ertiate owner.
{ Sending Identity Certiate FT is required to send his identity erti-
ate to RA for the initial ontat. It an then be reorded in a database
maintained by RA until a new identity ertiate is issued.
{ Updating Reputation Certiate
To prevent unneessary updating, statistis of ativity of the feedbak target
may be used to determine when the reputation rating should be updated.
An ative user may be given a short expiry date while an inative user has a
longer one. To issue a new reputation ertiate RA signs it using the proxy
private key s
RA
. The ertiate is sent to FT . A typial ertiate format
of the artiulated ertiate may be as follows.
Sig
RA
ExpR FT RA FT Rating
where Sig
RA
is the signature of RA and ExpR denotes the expiry date of
the reputation rating,
{ Showing Certiate Before any engagement with the intended RP , FT
may be required to show his reputation ertiate to RP so that his repu-
tation an be evaluated.
{ Validating Reputation Rating Prior to aepting the rating in the rep-
utation ertiate, RP alulates y
RA
and veries the ertiate validity
based on signature to the onditions in m
w
. If so RP aepts the reputation
rating as a valid reputation rating.
5 Disussion
There are several advantages held by our sheme ompared to other shemes.
{ Only one operation is required to verify the reputation ertiate, as only the
RA's signature needs to be heked by the relying party while the validity of
the identity ertiate is veried by RA. This advantage is also shared by the
basi ertiate. Separate ertiates and related ertiates, on the other
hand, require three omputations to verify the validity of both ertiates.
{ There is a separation of duties between the identity CA and reputation
authority. This is generally a good seurity pratie, and ensures that neither
is overloaded with management tasks.
{ Our sheme implements tightly-oupled binding between the identity and
reputation ertiates beause a single identity ertiate may be mapped
to multiple reputation ertiates. This advantage is shared by the ombined
ertiate while the separate ertiate implements loosely-oupled solution.
{ Our proposal has high reusability beause hanges to the reputation erti-
ate or the identity ertiate annot invalidate the reputation ertiate.
This is shared by the separate ertiate while the basi reputation and the
related ertiates have low reusability beause any hanges invalidate them.
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